Keywords: IFRS Analysts' information environment Forecast accuracy Target price forecast dispersion Investor protection mechanisms a b s t r a c t Exploiting the unique feature that Latin American countries have not undergone a significant change to the enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms, we investigate whether mandatory adoption of IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives improve analysts' information environment in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru), and whether the precision of public, private and consensus information improve after IFRS adoption. Test results show that mandatory adoption of IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives improve analysts' information environment. Overall, we confirm the positive effects of IFRS adoption, because the precision of public and consensus information is enhanced.
Introduction
Ball (2006) and Byard et al. (2011) argue that mandatory adoption of IFRS has the potential to improve the transparency of financial reports, facilitate cross-border investment, reduce information asymmetry, and contribute to the efficiency of the markets. These benefits rely on the presumption that, under IFRS, firms are required to provide high-quality information to investors, which implies greater comparability than domestic accounting standards (Horton et al., 2013) . High-quality information may also benefit analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001) , as their forecast accuracy may increase and the dispersion of their forecasts may reduce in the post-adoption period. Consistent with this view, past studies report an improvement in analysts' information environment following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in countries where there is strong enforcement of accounting standards (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Houqe et al., 2014) . However, the mandatory adoption of IFRS may not be the only factor responsible for improving analysts' information environment, as managers' incentives, the enforcement of accounting standards, and a country's investor protection mechanisms can also affect the information environment (see among others Byard et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014; Preiato et al., 2015) . Byard et al. (2011) report that IFRS only improves analysts' information environment in countries where the enforcement is strong. They also report that analysts' forecast accuracy improves more for firms that have incentives to adopt IFRS under the institutional settings of weak enforcement and greater disparity between domestic GAAP and IFRS. Houqe et al. (2014) also find an improvement in analysts' forecast accuracy in European countries with low investor protection mechanisms, but their sample is composed of countries that have strong enforcement of accounting standards (Brown et al., 2014) . Byard et al. (2011) rely on Kaufmann ings, the forecast dispersion of target price, and whether there are more analysts following Latin American firms in the postadoption period. Analysing these countries better allows us to investigate more accurately the effect of IFRS and firms' incentives, in contrast with several earlier studies (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015) , and mitigate the ''bundle effect" issue (Christensen et al., 2013) . Thus, we next evaluate whether firm-level reporting incentives alone, or the effect of both IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives, can affect the information environment. Third, in order to evaluate whether any improvement in analysts' information environment is really derived from the adoption of IFRS, we measure whether the precision of public and private information increased after the adoption of IFRS, following the approach suggested by Barron et al. (1998) . To achieve our objectives of investigating the long-term effect of IFRS, in contrast with previous literature we compare the measures of analysts' information environment in the four years before and the four years after the official date of mandatory adoption of IFRS.
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of IFRS on analysts' information environment in Latin American countries. It addresses the demand of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) for research investigating the impact of IFRS in developing economies. Second, unlike previous literature, this study measures the long-term effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption. Third, it shows that improvements to the analysts' information environment arise due to IFRS, which is denoted in the increased precision of public and consensus information. Fourth, our research design allows us to better investigate the sole effect of IFRS adoption on analysts' information environment and firm-level reporting incentives, as the adoption of IFRS in these countries is not bundled with changes in enforcement and investor protection mechanisms. Fifth, our metrics of analysts' information environment are also based on target price forecasts, in contrast with previous research that focuses solely on earnings forecasts (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015) . We believe our results shall be of interest and use to the IASB, regulators, and investment community.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents review of relevant literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 describes the data and sampling procedures. Section 5 discusses the results. Lastly, Section 6 concludes this study.
Literature review and hypotheses development
The prime objective of this study is to examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS can improve the quality of analysts' information environment in Latin American countries whose institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. We conjecture that there is a positive effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the quality of analysts' information environment measured in terms of analysts' forecast accuracy, number of analysts following firms, dispersion of earnings forecasts, and dispersion of target price forecasts. This is because, first, regulators in Latin America expect that IFRS adoption will increase the transparency and accounting quality of financial statements, in contrast with those prepared according to domestic accounting standards (see Fortin et al. (2010) for a discussion around this). 6 Thus, as regulators expect accounting quality to improve in the post-adoption period, the accuracy of earnings forecasts should improve as well (see Li et al., 2017) . Second, previous literature suggests that countries with a big gap between local standards and IFRS, which is the case of Latin American countries, should present a bigger improvement in accounting quality, which in turn would improve analysts' forecast accuracy (Bae et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011) . As Latin American firms are required to provide accounting information in higher quantity and quality under IFRS in comparison to previous domestic standards, the financial statements will be more transparent, consistent, and comparable, and analysts' earnings forecasts are likely to become more precise. Thus, the first hypothesis is:
H1a. The accuracy of earnings forecasts increased following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
As argued above, mandatory adoption of IFRS can increase the comparability and consistency of accounting information (e.g. Jones and Finley, 2011; Cascino and Gassen, 2015) . Thus, analysts can compare firms' financial statements worldwide as they are based on the same accounting standards, which shall help to improve their forecast accuracy and reduce the dispersion of their forecasts (Tan et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014) . As such, the disagreement among them is likely to reduce. We therefore set the following hypothesis:
H1b. The dispersion of earnings forecasts reduced following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
According to Lang and Lundholm (1996) , more analysts will follow a firm if its accounting quality improves. Additionally, mandatory IFRS adoption may reduce analysts' time and effort in acquiring and processing firms' information (Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014) . This reduces the costs and barriers for foreign analysts to cover more firms across the world, and as such more analysts are likely to follow Latin American firms in the post-adoption period. Thus, the hypothesis is:
H1c. The number of analysts following firms increased following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
Unlike previous research that investigates the impact of the IFRS adoption on analysts' information environment by using earnings forecasts only (Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015) , we expand the measures of analysts' information environment by also investigating the effect of IFRS on target price forecasts. We conjecture that the disagreement among analysts' target price forecasts will decline in the post-IFRS adoption period. Firstly, this is because mandatory adoption of IFRS might improve the accounting quality, and thus analysts would generally have more high-quality information available from the financial statements. As firms need to disclose more information due to the IFRS requirements, the information asymmetry among firms and investors is expected to decline. This helps analysts to shape their target price forecast. As such, considering that analysts rely on the financial statements to issue their forecasts (Loh and Mian, 2006) , high-quality information and lower information asymmetry would help to reduce the dispersion of the forecasts (Horton et al., 2013) . Secondly, earnings forecasts are one of the key inputs for predicting target price (Loh and Mian, 2006) , and IFRS leads to higher disclosure and transparency, which enables analysts to issue earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less dispersed, and disagreement in issuing target price should decrease among analysts. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:
H1d. The dispersion of target price forecast has declined following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
Our second objective is to investigate whether firm-level incentives on the implementation of IFRS affect analysts' information environment. Previous studies report that the effects of the adoption of IFRS may be due to firms' incentives, enforcement of accounting standards, and investor protection mechanisms (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2013) . As the institutional setting of Latin American countries is weak, there are opportunities for managers using their discretion on the implementation of IFRS. Under these institutional settings, to attract investments, we conjecture that firms with stronger reporting incentives may provide more information than firms with weaker reporting incentives. This assumption is based on the signalling theory, in which firms can signal the quality of their equity to investors by disclosing more information (Barth et al., 2008) . This helps to reduce the investors' perception of risk in investing in companies located in countries with weak institutional settings. Therefore, we set the following hypothesis:
H2. Analysts' information environment improved more for firms with stronger incentives to adopt IFRS in Latin America.
As analysts derive and process public and private information to generate their forecasts (Kim et al., 2017) , the third objective of this paper is to investigate how mandatory adoption of IFRS affects the precision of public information, private information, or both. This is to evaluate whether any improvement in analysts' information environment is reflected in greater precision arising from public information derived under IFRS. According to Byard et al. (2011) , IFRS adoption may increase the quality of public information, as firms are required to disclose more information in comparison to domestic standards. As the quantity and quality of accounting information are likely to increase (Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2008) , the public information contained in financial statements could lead to an improvement in the precision of analysts' forecasts (Horton et al., 2013) . Thus, we predict that IFRS adoption would lead to an improvement in the precision of public information. We also predict an improvement in the precision of public information in comparison to all available information (consensus) (Barron et al., 1998) . Therefore, the hypotheses are as follows:
H3a. The precision of public information is higher following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
H3b. The precision of consensus information is higher following mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America.
Research design
In this section, we first discuss the questionnaire issued to each country's security market regulator to investigate whether the institutional settings have changed around IFRS adoption. Secondly, we also discuss the results of the questionnaire in this section as it affects the econometric design of our research presented in the following sections. Thirdly, we present the four metrics (earnings forecast accuracy, dispersion of earnings forecasts, number of analysts following firms, and dispersion of target price forecasts) used to evaluate analysts' information environment. Then we discuss the econometric methods used to evaluate whether IFRS has contributed to improve the analysts' information environment, as well as whether firm-level incentives improve the analysts' information environment. Finally, this section reports the methods to calculate the precision of public, private and consensus information, and the analysis employed to evaluate whether IFRS has contributed or not to improve these.
Questionnaire -changes in institutional settings
The design of the questionnaire is based on La Porta et al. (1998) , Hope (2003) , the World Bank (2008) 7 report on the observance of standards and codes, and Brown et al. (2014) ; the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1. Firstly, the questionnaire was prepared in the local language of the target countries, and it was pre-tested (pilot tested) with native speakers in order to ascertain whether the questions were clear. Secondly, the questionnaire was uploaded to Google's forms in order to guarantee the consistency of its format for respondents in Latin American countries, and to allow a quicker and easier way for respondents to reply. It has two sections: the first section deals with enforcement of accounting standards; the second section focuses on the level of investor protection. We investigate the institutional setting by evaluating the current level of enforcement and investor protection of these countries as well as if they have changed around the IFRS adoption. At section one, questions 1 and 2 are based on Brown et al. (2014) and address whether there is a government body or a regulator monitoring the financial reporting of public companies. The third question is based on the work of Hope (2003) ; it addresses whether there were any companies that did not follow the IFRS guidelines even under mandatory adoption. Questions 4, 5 and 6 are designed based on the World Bank (2008) report. Questions 4 and 5 are designed to discover the penalties or consequences that each country issues for firms and managers if they do not comply with accounting rules in force. Moreover, it also helps to identify when the country enacted these rules. Emerging markets may only have enacted these laws more recently in comparison with developed markets. This is due to the level of development of local stock markets in comparison with those in developed markets. Question 6 investigates whether these penalties turned to be stricter after the adoption of IFRS. Question 7 is based on the rule of law of Hope (2003) and addresses whether the regulator has taken judicial action against a firm's non-compliant financial statement. Finally, the last question of the enforcement section measures whether there was an increase in the number of staff members responsible for monitoring the statements of public companies. This question is designed based on the enforcement index of Brown et al. (2014) .
At the investor protection section, questions 9 to 19 are designed based on La Porta et al. (1998) and Hope (2003) . Question 9 seeks the answer to the type of shareholder voting system in each country as the voting mechanism could be unbalanced (shares that have more voting rights) or balanced (one-share-one-vote). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the preferred mechanism to ensure the investor protection is the one-share-one-vote system. This is preferable because there are companies that issue nonvoting shares, founders' shares with extreme voting rights and shares that may have more voting rights according to the period for which one shareholder has held them. Thus, the one-share-one-vote system is preferable in order to guarantee equal and democratic rights. Questions 10 and 11 focus on the easiness of the voting system; they investigate whether the shareholder can vote through the mail or if the shareholder needs to present himself at the shareholders' meeting in order to be eligible to vote. The shareholders' protection is higher if there are fewer constraints within the voting system. Question 12 evaluates whether the minority shareholders have any right to challenge a director's decision in court; if they have the right to challenge his decisions, this is a sign of higher shareholder protection. Question 13 focuses on the minimum requirement of share capital needed in order to call for a shareholder meeting. A lower percentage of share capital needed indicates higher investor protection. That is, as the requirement is lower, shareholders can exercise their rights with greater ease. Question 14 evaluates whether there is a minimum mandatory dividend. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that countries with low investor protection mechanisms may require a minimum mandatory dividend in order to guarantee investors' rights. Thus, countries with stronger investor protection mechanisms may not require a minimum mandatory dividend because they have other mechanisms to safeguard the investors' interests. Questions 15 and 16 evaluate whether there was any change or increase in the shareholder's protection after the adoption of IFRS. Finally, questions 17 to 19 investigate the insider trading laws and enforcement of these laws. Question 17 addresses whether there were any insider trading activities in recent years. Question 18 discusses whether the regulator prosecuted the people involved in these insider trading activities. It is worth noting that countries with higher investor protection have a history where the regulator prosecuted the people involved in such activities. Question 19 investigates whether there were any convictions for those involved in insider trading activities.
Results of the questionnaire -enforcement
In this section we comment the main results of the questionnaire due to space, but all results are summarized and presented in Appendix 2.
With regard to questions 1 and 2, all five countries have had a securities market regulator monitoring the financial reporting of public companies, and this has not changed since the mandatory IFRS adoption. Regarding question 3, the Securities and Exchange Commission officers indicated that there are firms which did not comply with the IFRS requirements, which suggests a weak enforcement of accounting standards in these countries as also documented in Brown et al. (2014) .
Referring to question 4, all countries can issue fines and charges if a firm or manager does not comply with the accounting standards in force; however, only in Brazil the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to suspend temporarily the manager from his role. This indicates that Brazil has a stronger enforcement in comparison to other countries. The legislations concerning question 5 are listed on Appendix 2 and the replies from question 6 indicate that there has been no change in the penalties and consequences for firms' and managers' noncompliance behaviours since the adoption of IFRS. Regarding the number of firms caught by the regulator in the post-IFRS period only in Brazil there were a few companies caught by the regulator. With regard to question 8, no country reported an increase in staff members responsible for monitoring the implementation of IFRS concurrent with the adoption of IFRS. 8 Overall, the results indicate that the enforcement of these countries is weak; however, Brazil has a stronger enforcement in comparison with the other sampling countries, which is consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2014) . Additionally, according to the results of questions 2, 6 and 8, there were no concurrent changes in enforcement alongside the adoption of IFRS.
Results of the questionnaire -investor protection mechanisms
Regarding questions 9 and 10, all five countries adopt the system ''one-share-one-vote"; however, only in Peru and Chile the shareholder can vote through the mail. Thus, it is worth noting that Peru and Chile have higher investor protection mechanisms in comparison to the other Latin American countries with regard to question 10. Regarding question 11, only in Argentina the shareholder, in order to be eligible to vote, needs to deposit his shares in the company prior to a shareholder meeting. As a result, this represents a higher constraint in relation to other Latin American countries, which indicates that the investor protection mechanism in Argentina is lower than the other countries.
Referring to question 12, all countries allow the minority shareholders to prosecute and challenge the directors' decision in the court of justice. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, however, define that it is required at least 5% of share capital in order to challenge a director's decision in court, whereas Peru does not require a minimum percentage of share capital. Thus, Peru has a higher investor protection in comparison to the other Latin American countries with regard to this question. With regard to question 13 (percentage of share capital needed to call for a shareholder meeting), Argentina requires 60% in the first call and 30% in the second call; Brazil and Chile require 10%, Mexico specifies 75%, unless defined otherwise in the firm's statute, whereas Peru requires 20%. As Mexico demands the highest percentage, it is the country with the lowest investor protection mechanism in respect to this issue.
Regarding the mandatory dividend (question 14), Argentina does not specify a minimum, whereas Brazil, Chile and Mexico specify 25%, 30% and 5%, respectively. Moreover, Peru only defines 50% of mandatory dividends if 20% of the shareholders demand it. Thus, as Argentina and Peru do not specify a minimum percentage, they are likely to have stronger mechanisms to safeguard the investors' capital.
In relation to questions 15 and 16, it is worth noting that none of the countries have improved their investor protection mechanisms since the IFRS adoption. This allows this study to pinpoint with greater precision the impact of IFRS and firmlevel incentives.
With regard to question 17, only Brazil and Chile have informed the number of insider trading activities caught by the regulator. 9 In Brazil, the regulator caught the first case of insider trading in 2009, and the first conviction was only in November 2016. In Brazil and Chile, the replies of questions 18 and 19 illustrate that it is not the responsibility of the regulator to take further actions to court, but from the public ministry. Moreover, only in Brazil the regulator has prosecuted companies (please refer to Appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms per year), whereas the regulators from the other countries have not provided an answer to these questions. This illustrates that the investor protection mechanisms in Latin American countries are weak, and it is consistent with the investor ranking of La Porta et al. (1998) and the World Bank's ranking. It is worth noting though, that Brazil, Chile and Peru have stronger investor protection mechanisms than Argentina and Mexico.
In conclusion, our findings show that the institutional settings of these countries are weak, which is consistent to previous research (La Porta et al. 1998 , Brown et al., 2014 and have not been substantially improved concurrent with the adoption of IFRS. This shows that the institutional environment will not affect our inferences from the effect of the IFRS adoption. As these countries have a slightly different institutional setting: Brazil has the strongest enforcement among these countries and Brazil, Chile and Peru have stronger investor protection mechanisms. In order to control for this, the country fixed effects are implemented in our econometric design presented in the following sections.
Measures of analysts' information environment
To test H1, we adopt four metrics to evaluate whether the analysts' information environment improved after the IFRS adoption. According to Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Panaretou et al. (2013) , our first metric is the earnings' unsigned forecast error, which is calculated as follows:
8 There was an increment in staff members responsible for assisting in the monitoring of the accounting standards in force after two and two and a half years of the adoption of IFRS in Brazil and in Peru, respectively. Brazil hired 3 extra staff members in January of 2012, but they have been relocated to other roles in due course; by 2015, the number of staff responsible for the enforcement of the standards increased by only 1 member, and in Peru, 1 extra staff member was hired in July 2014. Overall, as the increment was years after the adoption of the standards and considering that staff has also been responsible for other roles, this is not considered as a significant change. 9 Please refer to the footnote of Appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms.
where FE t i;t denotes current-year (the superscript t) earnings' forecast error for firm i in year t; MeanforecastEPS t i;t is the mean of current-year earnings per share for firm i in year t. ActualEPS t i;t is the realised earnings per share collected from the Actual file of the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). SharePrice i;tÀ1 is the share price in year t À 1. 10 We use the forecasts issued during the six months prior to the earnings announcement date of each firm. 11 For further clarification on these calculations and the following calculations, please refer to Fig. 1 . We calculate the one-year-ahead earnings (the superscript t + 1)
forecast error for firm i in year t (FE tþ1 i;t ) in the same fashion. The second metric is the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (DISPFE t i;t ) of firm i in year t. According to Byard et al. (2011) and Preiato et al. (2015) , this is equal to the standard deviation of forecasted EPS scaled by the previous share price in model (2) 12 :
We also calculate the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (DISPFE tþ1 i;t ) of firm i in year t in the same fashion. The third metric is the logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm, according to model (3).
where FOLLOW t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). We calculate this variable for analysts following firm i that issue one-year-ahead forecasts in the same fashion.
The fourth metric is the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts of firm i in year t (DISPFETP t i;t ) defined according to model (4).
whereStDev forecastTP i;t À Á denotes the standard deviation of current-year target price of firm i in year t; MeanforecastTP i;t is the absolute mean of target price forecasts of firm i in year t.
We calculate forecast errors and dispersion of forecasts according to forecast observations issued within the last six months before the earnings announcement date of firm i in year t. Other market and accounting variables are calculated according to the financial year of firm i. Fig. 1 presents the calculations of variables.
Overall impact of IFRS
To examine the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts' information environment due to hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d, we report seven regressions estimates according to models (5), (6) and (7) in the following:
At model (5), INFENV t i;t is a common variable, which denotes current-year earnings forecast error (FE t i;t ), one-year-head earnings forecast errors (FE tþ1 i;t ), dispersion of current-year earnings forecast error (DISPFE t i;t ), or one-year-ahead earnings forecast error (DISPFE tþ1 i;t ). IFRS i;t is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS adoption and is equal to 0 otherwise. If the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves analysts' information environment, b 1 is expected to be negatively significant. The following variables are control variables. EPSD i;t is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t Àgroups for our industrial firms. So, we set twelve industry dummies: Dummy 1: Sector 11, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; Dummy 2: Sector 21, mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction; Dummy 3 
LOGFOLLOW
Model (6) assesses the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the log of the number of analysts issuing current-year earnings forecasts for the firms in our sample (LOGFOLLOW
Model (7) investigates the impact of IFRS on the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts (DISPFETP t i;t ) due to hypothesis H1d. LOGFOLLOWTP t i;t denotes the log of the number of analysts issuing current-year target price forecasts. LOGHORIZONTP t i;t is the log of 1 plus the mean of the number of days between each analyst's target price forecast, and the earnings announcement date for firm i in year t.
Firm-level reporting incentives
Our second objective is to investigate whether firms with stronger incentives to adopt IFRS would perceive a higher enhancement in analysts' information environment, which matches our second hypothesis H2. Earlier research (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011 , Christensen et al., 2013 indicates that: (i) highly profitable firms, (ii) firms that have higher growth opportunities, (iii) highly leveraged firms, (iv) greatly internationalized firms, and (v) firms audited by high-quality auditors, have stronger incentives to produce high-quality financial reports. As such, we follow the model of Byard et al. (2011) by introducing the above five factors into the models (8), (9) and (10). They are as follows. Fig. 1 . Illustration of the calculations of forecast error and forecast dispersion. The observations of current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, and current-year target price, are collected within the first six months prior to the earnings announcement date of firm i in year t. Then, we calculate the mean and median of forecast errors of current-year earnings and one-year-ahead earnings due to model (1), dispersion of current-year earnings, oneyear-ahead earnings and current-year target price due to model (2), and number of analysts issued forecasts due to model (3) based on these observations with the first six months prior to the earnings announcement date of firm i in year t. Market and accounting variables are calculated according to the financial year end of firm i in year t.
where AUD i;t equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise it equals 0. BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio. It is a proxy for growth opportunities. LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. It denotes the firm's internationality. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. We expect that the coefficients on AUD i;t , LEV i;t , ROA i;t and NUMEX i;t in the above models will be significantly negative, whereas the coefficient of BTMV i;t will be significantly positive if a firm has stronger reporting incentives and can improve the analysts' information environment.
Next, we investigate whether the adoption of IFRS can improve analysts' information environment in Latin American countries with weak institutional settings after controlling for the effect of firm-level reporting incentives. Therefore, we introduce the IFRS dummy in the following models (11), (12) and (13):
We expect that the coefficient on IFRS i;t will remain consistent with those coefficients in models (5), (6) and (7).
Analysis of the precision of public, private and consensus information
The above models demonstrate the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts' information environment. In this section we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS affects the precision of public, private, and consensus information. Models to investigate the precision of information started with Barry and Jennings (1992) and Abarbanell et al. (1995) . Afterwards, Barron et al. (1998) extended their measure in order to model the type and the precision of information that analysts use to issue their forecasts. Barron et al. (1998) argue that those analysts' forecast errors are composed of a common error and an idiosyncratic error. The common error reflects the error in the public information which analysts rely upon, whereas the idiosyncratic error reflects the error in the private information that analysts rely upon. 13 As such, we examine the precision of information after mandatory IFRS adoption by adopting the approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011) , which is detailed as follows:
where D i;t is the variance of analysts' forecasts for firm i in year t. SE i;t is the squared error in the mean forecast, and N i;t is the number of forecasts for firm i in year t (Byard et al., 2011) . Different from the approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011) , we standardize 14 the variables of PUBLIC i;t , PRIVATE i;t , and CONSENSUS i;t after the calculations of models (14), (15) and (16). This is because the denominator in models (14) and (15) 
To maintain consistency, SIZE i;t is also standardized in the same fashion. 16 We predict that the coefficient of IFRS i;t associated with PUBLIC i;t or CONSENSUS i;t is positive, which indicates an improvement in the precision of public information or consensus information brought about by the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Analysts may still rely on private information, but we do not expect that IFRS will increase the precision of private information; therefore, we expect the association between IFRS i;t and PRIVATE i;t to be insignificant. Appendix 1 presents the definition of the variables.
Sample and data
In this section we illustrate the sample selection criteria, as well as the data sources and the descriptive statistics of our data. Finally, we present univariate analysis regarding the effect of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts' information environment.
Sampling criteria
We consider only industrial firms listed on Latin American stock exchanges. We exclude banks and financial institutions as their accounting standards are different to those of industrial firms as well as we exclude early adopters by manually checking the IFRS adoption date of each firm. We choose the sample period from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2015 after referring to the official dates of IFRS adoption in Latin American countries reported on the IFRS website. 17 In this study, we focus on four years before and four years after the official dates of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in each country. Given the above criteria for data collection our sample comprises of firms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, as firms from other Latin American countries adopted IFRS after 2014, or their data in the sample period is not available.
Data source
Analysts' forecast data is collected from the Detail File of I/B/E/S. The actual earnings per share are collected from the Actual File of I/B/E/S. The market and accounting data are from the DataStream database. Although I/B/E/S has analysts' EPS forecasts since 1980, its coverage for Latin American countries is limited because analysts tend to follow only large firms with higher trading volumes (Hayes, 1998) . The number of analysts following firms in Latin America is therefore lower in comparison with developed nations. After the introduction of IFRS, the average number of analysts following firms doubled for the five countries of our sample.
14 The standardization consists of subtracting for each variable the mean of the variable and scaling by its standard deviation. 15 This study finds similar results by following the method of Byard et al. (2011) , and by bootstrapping the sample 1000 times. 16 As in Byard et al. (2011) , SIZE i;t is used as the only control variable because it is the variable that has higher influence over the quantity and quality of the information available. Another variable such as the number of analysts following could also affect the precision of information; the inferences are similar if LOGFOLLOW t i;t is included. 17 http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-profiles/.
Sample description
We find 618 firms from the Detail File of I/B/E/S. However, excluding the financial sector as well as early adopters leaves us with 534 companies. Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample structure of these five countries. There are 97 firms for which all required data is available in at least one of the eight years around the official date of IFRS adoption. Panel B shows that there is 1 firm in Argentina, 76 firms in Brazil, 17 firms in Chile, 3 firms in Mexico, and no firms from Peru. The total number of firms in our sample is therefore 97.
18 Considering the small sample size, we also conduct another set of empirical analysis referring to the Summary File of I/B/E/S, which contains 285 firms with data available regarding the earnings' forecasts (accuracy, dispersion and number of analysts following) as illustrated in Panel C. Of the 285 firms, 278 have target price forecasts. These analyses are not reported, but are available upon request. We reach very similar results and the same conclusion as those reported in the following sections. 4.4. Descriptive statistics Table 2 shows that the current-year earnings forecast error (FE t i;t ) decreased following the IFRS adoption, and that the difference between the pre-and post-adoption period is significant at 5%. In contrast, the one-year-ahead earnings forecast error (FE tþ1 i;t ) and the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (DISPFE t i;t ) are lower following mandatory IFRS adoption; however, the difference is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (DISPFE tþ1 i;t ) and the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts (DISPFETP t i;t Þ decreased in the post-adoption period and the difference between the two periods is statistically significant at 5%. LOGFOLLOW t i;t and LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t are higher following mandatory IFRS adoption and these results are statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that the number of analysts following the firms increased in the post-adoption period. PUBLIC i;t and CONSENSUS i;t increased, and this increase is statistically significant at 10% and 1% respectively. These results suggest that the precision of public and consensus information increased following IFRS adoption. However, as there is no significant difference in PRIVATE i;t across the two periods, this suggests that the precision of private information did not increase following IFRS adoption, which is in line with our prediction. Overall, the results suggest that analysts' information environment improved following mandatory IFRS adoption.
Regarding the incentive variables, only the difference in the book-to-market value (BTMV i;t ) is statistically significant at 5%. For the control variables, the differences in LOGHORIZON We find the same significant changes in the logarithm of market value (SIZE i;t ) and in EPSD i;t .
Univariate analysis for firm-level reporting incentives
To examine whether firm-level reporting incentives affect the analysts' information environment, we compare analysts' earnings forecast errors and the dispersion of earnings forecasts between firms with strong reporting incentives and firms with weak reporting incentives: (a) in the 8 years around the IFRS adoption date and (b) in the 4 years after the IFRS adoption date. We then focus on (c) firms with strong reporting incentives in the 8 years around the IFRS adoption date specifically. We classify the firms as having strong or weak reporting incentives based on the following variables: (i) firms audited by Big 4 audit firms versus other audit firms, AUD i;t ; (ii) firms with more international listings versus no international listings,NUMEX i;t ; (iii) firms which are more profitable versus those which are less profitable,ROA i;t ; (iv) firms with a greater debt ratio versus a lower debt ratio,LEV i;t ; and (v) firms with more growth opportunities versus fewer growth opportunities,BTMV i;t . We classify a firm as having strong reporting incentives if it is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm (AUD i;t ) or lists on foreign stock exchanges (NUMEX i;t ). It is classified as having weak reporting incentives if it is audited by other auditing firms, or only lists on domestic stock exchanges. Similarly, we classify a firm as having strong reporting incentives if its ROA i;t , or LEV i;t are above the average values of these variables in the same industry, otherwise it is classified as having weak reporting incentives. For BTMV i;t , a firm is classified as having strong reporting incentives if it has a lower than average value of this variable in the same industry, otherwise it is classified as having weak reporting incentives.
Panel A of Table 3 reports that the differences in the mean of current-year forecast errors (FE t i;t ) between firms with strong and weak incentives in the 8 years around the IFRS adoption are statistically significant at 1% and 10% respectively. Nevertheless, the mean of current-year forecast errors for highly leveraged firms and firms with more growth opportunities is bigger, and the difference is significant at 1%. This implies that analysts find it challenging to issue forecasts for these firms. This 18 This is the number of firms with available data for all control variables regarding earnings forecasts. The number of firms for the other analyses is different due to data availability. For the detailed number of firms with data available for each analysis, please refer to the information available at the bottom of each table. 19 The models adopted in this set of analyses differ slightly from the ones reported in the paper. As this is the summary file, we do not have the forecast horizon (LOGHORIZON t i;t ; LOGHORIZON tþ1 i;t ; LOGHORIZONTP t i;t Þ as a control variable, because this information is not available in I/B/E/S. may be because highly leveraged firms may defer the recognition of bad news in case it does not help to improve the firms' financial position, whereas there are higher expectations (bigger room) for firms with more growth opportunities, which can affect the forecasting ability of analysts.
Panel B of Table 3 reports that the differences in the mean of current-year forecast errors (FE t i;t ) between firms with strong and weak incentives in the 4 years after the IFRS adoption date are statistically significant at 1%, except for firms classified by NUMEX i;t which is not statistically significant. This suggests that the current-year earnings forecast errors for firms with strong incentives are significantly lower than those for firms with weak incentives in the 4 years after the IFRS adoption. The results for firms classified by LEV i;t and BTMV i;t are similar to those in Panel A.
Panel C of Table 3 reports that firms with strong reporting incentives have current-year forecast errors which are significantly lower in the post-IFRS adoption compared to pre-IFRS adoption at 1%, except those firms classified by AUD i;t . This suggests that for firms with strong incentives, there is a further enhancement in analysts' information environment in the postadoption period. Therefore, firms' reporting incentives affect analysts' information environment beyond the impact of IFRS. Table 4 reports the changes in the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (DISPFE t i;t ) for firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in the same fashion as Table 3 . The results are consistent with those in Table 3 .
We undertake the same analysis for one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, and dispersion of current-year target price. The results are highly consistent with those in Tables 3 and 4 . We do not report these results, but they are available upon request. They confirm that firms' reporting incentives play a role in shaping the analysts' information environment. The above is based on univariate analysis, and will be confirmed using multivariate analysis in the next section.
Results
This section firstly explores the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts' information environment. Afterwards, we investigate whether firm-level reporting incentives can influence the information environment, and whether IFRS can affect analysts' information environment after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. Lastly, we report the results regarding whether the precision of public, private and consensus information improved after the IFRS adoption. Table 5 reports the results of estimating models (5), (6) and (7) * , ** , *** indicate the statistical significant difference between means (medians) in 'Pre' and in 'Post' at the 10%, 5%, 1% (respectively) two-tailed test. FE t i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for current-year forecasts. FE tþ1 i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for one-year ahead forecasts. LOGFOLLOW t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript t + 1) in year t (the subscript t). DISPFE t i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFE tþ1 i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of oneyear-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFETP t i;t The standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts. PUBLIC i;t denotes the standardized values according to equation (14) . PRIVATE i;t denotes the standardized values according to equation (15) . CONSENSUS i;t is the ratio that equals to PUBLIC i;t divided by PUBLIC i;t plus PRIVATE i;t . AUD i;t equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio.LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. SIZE i;t is the log of the market value of equity. EPSD i;t is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t À 1 to t scaled by the share price in year t À 1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014) . R i;t-1 is the stock return of firm i in year t À 1. LOGHORIZON t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t. LOGHORIZON tþ1 i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date of year t + 1. LOGHORIZONTP t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts' forecast of target price, and target price of year t.LOGFOLLOWTP t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year target price forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).
Overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS
ables. These results demonstrate whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts' information environment in Latin American countries, where the institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak.
The results show that the coefficients of IFRS i;t are significantly negative for the regressions on FE t i;t andDISPFE t i;t , as well as for the regression on DISPFETP t i;t at 5% and 10%, respectively. These results indicate that analysts' forecast errors, as well as analysts' forecast dispersion, decrease after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, for the regressions on FE tþ1 i;t andDISPFE tþ1 i;t , the coefficients of IFRS i;t are insignificantly positive. This indicates that there is no significant change in analysts' one-yearahead earnings forecast errors, and in analysts' one-year-ahead forecast dispersion, in the post-adoption period. This may be forecast error for firms with strong reporting incentives is lower after the IFRS adoption in comparison to firms with weak reporting incentives. AUD i;t equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio. * , ** and *** indicate the statistical significance between means at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, two-tailed test. In this table, we evaluate whether the dispersion of earnings forecasts for firms with strong reporting incentives is lower after the IFRS adoption in comparison to firms with weak reporting incentives. AUD i;t equals one if one of a Big 4 auditor audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio.
because analysts already digest the effect of IFRS adoption on firms' reporting quality in the year of adoption, and expect that the improved accounting information quality will be maintained in the future. In other words, they already reflect this in one-year-ahead earnings forecasts.
In the regressions of LOGFOLLOW t i;t and LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t , the estimated coefficients on IFRS i;t are significantly positive at 1%. This suggests that, after Latin American firms adopt IFRS, the number of analysts following firms increases significantly. This may be due to the increased disclosure of financial information required by IFRS. In summary, the above results indicate that analysts' information environment improves in the post-adoption period.
The coefficients on SIZE i;t are statistically significant in the regressions of FE t i;t , DISPFE t i;t and DISPFE tþ1 i;t at 10% respectively. This suggests that the current-year earnings forecast error of the analysts following larger firms is slightly higher than for analysts following smaller firms, whereas their dispersion is lower. Moreover, the coefficients on SIZE i;t in the regressions of LOGFOLLOW t i;t and LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t are significantly positive at 1%, which illustrates that larger firms have more analysts following them. The estimated coefficients on R i;tÀ1 are significantly positive at 5% and 1% in the regressions on DISPFE tþ1 i;t and DISPFETP t i;t . This suggests that analysts use the stock returns to derive their forecasts. However, it also illustrates that the more analysts rely on stock returns, the more their disagreement increases. The estimated coefficient on LOGFOLLOW t i;t is only significant in the regression on DISPFE t i;t . This coefficient is significantly positive, which is contrary to our predictions. However, it is worth noting that more analysts following firms creates room for increased disagreement among them (Houqe et al., 2014) , and this could explain these results. Lastly, the estimated coefficient of LOGHORIZONTP t i;t is Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * , ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, we use several regressions to evaluate whether IFRS i;t ; which is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS adoption and is equal to 0 otherwise, is significant in improving the analysts' information environment. FE t i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for current-year forecasts. FE tþ1 i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for one-year ahead forecasts. DISPFE t i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFE tþ1 i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFETP t i;t The standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts. LOGFOLLOW t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript t + 1) in year t (the subscript t). SIZE i;t is the log of the market value of equity. EPSD i;t is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t À 1 to t scaled by the share price in year t À 1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014) . R i;t-1 is the stock return of firm i in year t À 1. LOGHORIZON t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t. LOGHORIZON tþ1 i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date of year t + 1. LOGHORIZONTP t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts' forecast of target price, and target price of year t.LOGFOLLOWTP t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year target price forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).
significantly positive at 10%, which indicates that the dispersion of target price forecasts is higher when the forecast horizon is longer. The above results are consistent with hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d.
The impact of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts' information environment
In this section we investigate how firm-level reporting incentives affect analysts' information environment, based on models (8), (9) and (10) i;t ) on variables that denote firm-level reporting incentives (AUD i;t , BTMV i;t , LEV i;t , NUMEX i;t , ROA i;t ) and the control variables. Table 6 shows that AUD i;t is significantly associated with LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t at 1%, and that BTMV i;t is significantly associated with DISPFE t i;t , LOGFOLLOW t i;t and LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t at 10%, 1% and 5% respectively. These findings suggest that the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts decreases for firms with greater growth opportunities, whereas there are more analysts following firms with lower growth opportunities. The coefficient of LEV i;t is significantly negative in the regression of DISPFETP t i;t at 1%, which indicates that the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts is higher for highly leveraged firms. NUMEX i;t has a significantly negative coefficient at 10% in the regression on DISPFE t i;t , which indicates that the analysts' forecast dispersion is lower for firms listed on foreign exchanges. Lastly, the coefficient of ROA i;t is significantly negative at 1% for the regression of DISPFETP t i;t , which indicates that the dispersion of target price forecasts is lower for firms with greater profitability. Overall, these results indicate that firms' reporting incentives do affect analysts' information environment. This is consistent with hypothesis H2 and confirms the results from the univariate analysis reported in Section 4.5.
Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts' information environment after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives
Given the results in Tables 5 and 6 , we now examine whether IFRS improves analysts' information environment after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives based on models (11), (12) and (13) Table 5 , implying that mandatory adoption of IFRS can improve analysts' information environment after controlling firms' incentives, particularly when the institutional settings of Latin American countries, such as the enforcement of accounting standards and the investor protection mechanisms, are weak and did not change significantly in the 4 years following the IFRS adoption. Table 7 , along with the previous sections, shows that IFRS can improve analysts' information environment in Latin American countries after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives, and under the weak institutional setting, without significant changes to enforcement and investor protection. In this section we further investigate how mandatory adoption of IFRS affects analysts' public, private and consensus information based on the works of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011) . Based on model (17), Table 8 presents the association between IFRS i;t and PUBLIC i;t , PRIVATE i;t and CONSENSUS i;t , respectively.
The precision of the information environment
The results show that IFRS i;t is positively associated with PUBLIC i;t at 5% significance. This suggests that the precision of public information is higher following the IFRS adoption. This is consistent with the hypothesis H3a. However, the association between IFRS i;t and PRIVATE i;t is insignificantly negative. This suggests that the adoption of IFRS increases the precision of public information, but it does not affect analysts' information gathered from private sources. IFRS i;t is positively associated with CONSENSUS i;t at 1%. This suggests that the precision of consensus information is also increased, which is consistent with the findings of increased precision of public information.
In summary, our results show that IFRS improves the precision of public and consensus information. Together with the results in Tables 5 and 7 , we conclude that the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts' information environment in Latin American countries, after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. This improvement is mainly reflected in the precision of public information and consensus information.
Additional robustness tests
We have conducted a battery of robustness tests. First, we also estimated all regressions using firm-fixed effects to control for firm specific characteristics within a country and our inferences remained unchanged. Second, we gathered another sam-ple of firms from the IBES summary file as pointed out on Section 4.3 with 285 firms presented on table 1, panel C and also find similar results. Third, as the findings of this study could be attributed to analysts improving their forecast accuracy over time and not due to the adoption of IFRS, we generate another set of results (not reported) by estimating all regressions with a trend variable included. This variable is set as a continuous increasing trend over the years. For instance, it is 1 if the year is 2006, 2 if the year is 2007, 3 if the year is 2008, etc. This variable identifies whether the metrics employed in this study are affected by a trend overtime. It suggests that such a trend is not a problem and the results remain consistent to those presented above, as this variable is insignificant. Fourth, we have also extensively tried to use a difference-in-difference design, however there is a major problem with this approach in our case. All firms are mandated to adopt IFRS in our sample and as such we do not have any non-adopter to compare with considering the countries in our sample. We have tried to get data for firms in other countries that share the institutional settings with Latin American countries that had not adopted IFRS prior to 2015 and have data available to conduct the analyses. To some extent we have tried to use data of firms from Colombia that Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * , ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, we use several metrics to evaluate whether firms incentives denoted by AUD i;t ,BTMV i;t , LEV i;t , NUMEX i;t and ROA i;t are significant in improving the analysts' information environment. AUD i;t equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio.LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. FE t i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for current-year forecasts. FE tþ1 i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for one-year ahead forecasts. DISPFE t i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFE tþ1 i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFETP t i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts. LOGFOLLOW t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript t + 1) in year t (the subscript t). SIZE i;t is the log of the market value of equity. EPSD i;t is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t À 1 to t scaled by the share price in year t À 1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014) . R i;t-1 is the stock return of firm i in year t À 1. LOGHORIZON t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t. LOGHORIZON tþ1 i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date of year t + 1. LOGHORIZONTP t i;t is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts' forecast of target price, and target price of year t.LOGFOLLOWTP t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year target price forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).
have only adopted IFRS in 2014 and Bolivia that have not adopted IFRS. However, there are no firms with data available using the IBES detail file. Moreover, we have also tried to use the IBES summary file, however there are only 2 Colombian firms with data available with many missing control variables as well as missing long-term mean provided by the analysts. Therefore, we could not adopt this research design.
Conclusion
This study investigates (i) whether mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts' information environment in Latin American countries; (ii) whether firm-level reporting incentives affect the analysts' information environment; and (iii) Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * , ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, we use several metrics to evaluate whether IFRS i;t ; which is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS adoption and is equal to 0 otherwise, is significant in improving the analysts' information environment after controlling for firms' incentives. FE t i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for current-year forecasts. FE tþ1 i;t is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1 for one-year ahead forecasts. DISPFE t i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFE tþ1 i;t is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t À 1. DISPFETP t i;t The standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts. LOGFOLLOW t i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).LOGFOLLOW tþ1 i;t denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript t + 1) in year t (the subscript t). AUD i;t equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.BTMV i;t is the book to market value ratio.LEV i;t is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. NUMEX i;t is the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. ROA i;t is the ratio of net income over total assets. SIZE i;t is the log of the market value of equity. EPSD i;t is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t À 1 to t scaled by the share price in year t À 1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014) . R i;tÀ1 is the stock return of firm i in year t À 1. LOGHORIZON whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the precision of public and consensus information. We expand the measures of analysts' information environment currently used by the literature such as the number of analysts following firms, analysts' forecast errors, and dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts; we include these metrics regarding one-yearahead earnings forecasts as well as the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts. We also extend the measurement period to four years prior and four years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. This allows us to examine the long-term effect of IFRS adoption. The results show that the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves analysts' information environment in Latin American countries. This may be because of the difference between the domestic accounting standards and IFRS, and the increase in disclosure required by IFRS. This result holds after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. Second, firm-level reporting incentives can improve analysts' information environment. This may be because firms intend to signal the quality of their equity to investors by adopting IFRS when investors perceive a high cost to verify financial information, and risk in investing in emerging markets. Third, the improvement in analysts' information environment, brought out by the mandatory adoption of IFRS, is reflected in the enhanced precision of public and consensus information. As the precision of public and consensus information is improved, this strengthens the above explanation that the adoption of IFRS enhances the quality of information available to analysts, in comparison to the quality of information provided by the previous domestic standards, which were mainly designed for tax and government needs, and were of little use for the external users.
Our research extends the literature regarding the impact of IFRS on analysts' information environment. Christensen et al. (2013) and Preiato et al. (2015) indicate that a country's institutional settings, and its development over the years, are mixed with the impact of the IFRS adoption. As such, previous literature that has not considered these features would need to be revisited. By investigating Latin American countries where the institutional settings have not changed significantly, we mitigate the issue raised by previous literature and bring more accurate evidence of the sole effect of the IFRS adoption. Our study indicates that the adoption of IFRS can benefit analysts covering Latin American firms, mainly due to the big gap between IFRS and previous domestic accounting standards that affects the quality and usefulness of financial statements in the long-term. It is worth noting, however, that the benefits from the adoption of IFRS could take more time to appear depending on countries' institutional settings, firms' incentives, and the difference between IFRS and previous domestic accounting standards. Thus, we suggest that future studies consider a long-term approach in comparison with a shortterm approach (2 years before and after the IFRS adoption, for instance) in their research design. Investigating a shortterm approach may lead to inconclusive evidence about the impact of IFRS, and as such future research can cast more light on the impact of IFRS adoption on analysts' information environment in other countries by investigating the longer-term.
Our study is a reference point for the IASB and the regulators of Latin American countries. The results confirm the positive impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS as well as the governments' policies regarding the implementation of these standards. As analysts' information environment improves, this could be beneficial for investors who could now more accurately assess their risks in investing in these emerging economies. It could be beneficial for forming portfolios and achieving higher yields as they compare the performance of these firms with other international firms. Following the economic and political crises that these countries have faced in recent years, lower inflation rates and higher growth rates alongside the increase in the reliability of financial statements of public companies may attract more investment, which could lead to an improvement in market efficiency as well as market liquidity (Han et al., 2016) . Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * , ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. PRECISION i;t is a common variable that denotes PUBLIC i;t , PRIVATE i;t , andCONSENSUS i;t , which represent the precision of public, private and all available (consensus) information (Barron et al., 1998) . IFRS i;t is a dummy that equals to 1 for the IFRS period, otherwise zero. SIZE i;t is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year t.
